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Playing the Language Game of 
Family Mediation: Implications 
for Mediator Ethics
Rachael Field and Jonathan Crowe*
Over the last 20 to 30 years, the use of mediation in Australia to resolve 
family disputes has grown significantly. Since the 2006 reforms to 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), family dispute resolution, a common 
form of which is family mediation, has effectively become a compulsory 
first step in post-separation parenting disputes that enter the family 
law system. There are many good reasons for encouraging parties to 
participate in family mediation. Mediation is a flexible, cost-effective, 
time-efficient, more humane, less adversarial way for families to 
manage and resolve post-separation disputes. Family mediation is 
also a process that enables party self-determination, empowering the 
parties to determine together the best arrangements for their family 
into the future. However, vigilance is required if the capacity of each 
party to negotiate towards a mutually agreeable outcome is to be 
effectively sustained and the full potential of the benefits of mediation 
are truly to be achieved. In this article, we use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
concept of a language game and the related notion of a clash of genres 
to explore some of the underlying conventions and expectations that 
create challenges for the parties in family mediation. We then consider 
how mediators might respond to these challenges and the implications 
this holds for mediator ethics. 
I  IntroductIon
Family mediation is now the predominant system used in Australia for 
the resolution of post-separation family disputes.1 The process has many 
benefits, including its informality, flexibility and less confrontational 
nature; its ability to promote party self-determination; and its focus on the 
parties’ mutual needs and interests, along with the best interests of the 
children.2 Family mediation is intentionally designed to be a supportive 
*  The authors would like to thank Olivia Rundle, Camilla Baasch Andersen and 
the anonymous referees for their valuable comments. An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the Australian Dispute Resolution Research Network 
Roundtable at the University of New South Wales in September 2015. Thanks 
to all who took part in the discussion. 
1 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60I; Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) Sch 1, Pt 2. 
2 See, for example, Linda Fisher and Mieke Brandon, Mediating with Families 
(Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2012); Michael King, Arie Freiberg and Becky Batagol, 
Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 104-106; Laurence 
Boulle and Rachael Field, Australian Dispute Resolution: Law and Practice 
(Butterworths LexisNexis, 2017) Chs 2 and 7.
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and supported negotiation environment, empowering the parties and 
building their capacity to negotiate mutually appropriate outcomes. 
However, the process also presents the parties with some significant 
challenges. The efficacy and legitimacy of the family mediation process 
demands that these challenges be properly understood and recognised.3
One of the core tenets of family mediation is that the parties are the 
protagonists in the process – negotiating on their own behalf; articulat-
ing their own stories, interests, issues and concerns; and giving voice to 
the needs and interests of their children.4 The mediator is expected to 
use a range of process and communication skills to enable the parties to 
engage in cooperative and collaborative bargaining. The parties too have 
responsibilities or they are expected to respect the process and engage in 
it constructively. In order to achieve mutual and sustainable outcomes, 
the parties are asked to make a genuine effort and demonstrate, at least 
to some extent, a level of rational, reasonable negotiation.5 This can be 
challenging, because the post-separation period is often one of the most 
chaotic, uncertain, stressful and emotional times of the parties’ lives.6 The 
process therefore asks a lot of the parties, even when supported by the 
mediator’s presence and expertise. 
The factors articulated above make it important to clearly under-
stand the nature of the challenges facing the parties in family mediation. 
Mediation theory has often glossed over these challenges, positing that 
the process itself effectively addresses or counteracts them.7 For example, 
it is assumed that the informal nature of family mediation makes it a 
less challenging negotiation environment because there are no formal 
3 Compare Rachael Field and Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Construction of Rationality 
in Australian Family Dispute Resolution: A Feminist Analysis’ (2007) 27 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 97; Jonathan Crowe and Rachael Field, ‘The 
Problem of Legitimacy in Mediation’ (2008) 9(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 48; 
Susan Armstrong, ‘Recognition and Relationality with Families and Children 
from Minority Cultural and Faith Backgrounds in Australian Family Dispute 
Resolution’ (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law 203. 
4 Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving 
Conflict Without Litigation (Jossey-Bass, 1984); Jay Folberg, Ann Milne and 
Peter Salem (eds), Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and 
Applications (Guilford Press, 2004).
5 See, for example, Hilary Astor, ‘Making a Genuine Effort in Family Dispute 
Resolution: What Does It Mean?’ (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 
102. See also Field and Crowe, above n 3.
6 See, for example, Peter Reder and Clare Lucey, Assessment of Parenting: 
Psychiatric and Psychological Contributions (Routledge, 2014); Hamilton I 
McCubbin and Charles R Figley, Stress and the Family: Coping with Normative 
Transitions (Routledge, 1983); Rudolf Moos (ed), Coping with Life Crises: An 
Integrated Approach (Springer, 1986).
7 See, for example, Joan Kelly, ‘Power Imbalance in Divorce and Interpersonal 
Mediation: Assessment and Intervention’ (1995) 13 Mediation Quarterly 85; Joan 
Kelly and Mary Duryee, ‘Women and Men’s Views of Mediation in Voluntary and 
Mandatory Mediation Settings’ (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 
34; Joan Kelly, ‘Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents’ Perceptions of 
Their Processes and Outcomes’ (1989) 24 Mediation Quarterly 71. 
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legal rules of procedure and evidence that have to be followed. It is also 
assumed that the even-handed facilitated structure of the process and 
the emphasis on relational party self-determination and collaborative 
negotiation evens out the negotiation playing field. For these reasons, 
it is common (particularly in the form of family mediation practised in 
Family Relationships Centres) for the parties in family mediation not to 
be legally represented.8 
This article argues that the challenges parties face in family media-
tion must be better recognised and accommodated if the process is truly 
to support them to reach effective and mutual outcomes. We argue that, 
although family mediation has many built-in support elements, it is 
nonetheless structured by underlying expectations and aspirations that 
may be opaque to the parties, particularly as they are often first-time, 
inexperienced participants. These expectations potentially create hidden 
barriers for parties who lack knowledge of the family mediation process 
and the surrounding legal framework. We argue that mediators have 
an ethical obligation to be aware of these barriers and work actively to 
address them.
The article begins by outlining a theoretical framework for under-
standing the background norms of the family mediation environment. 
We use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game to explain the 
underlying conventions of different forms of social discourse.9 We argue 
that parties without previous exposure to family mediation often expe-
rience what might be termed a clash of genres, whereby the modes of 
communication and conduct with which they are familiar in fact conflict 
with the implicit expectations of the mediation process.10 A clash of genres 
potentially compromises the parties’ capacity to negotiate effectively in 
family mediation. Furthermore, the nature of a clash of genres is such 
that it often cannot be easily articulated and may go unacknowledged.
The article then looks more closely at the features of the family 
mediation environment. We turn first to the emphasis in mediation on 
party self-determination, arguing that while this focus has many positive 
features, it tends to exacerbate, rather than diminish, the possibility of 
a clash of genres. We explore how the informal nature of the mediation 
process renders it porous; its structure is prone to be shaped by the norms of 
the language game of mediation. We also consider the interaction between 
8 See, for example, Australian Government Attorney General’s Department, 
Operational Framework for Family Relationship Centres (2007). Compare Lawrie 
Moloney et al, Evaluation of the Family Relationship Centre Legal Assistance 
Partnerships Program: Final Report (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
2011). For further discussion of the role of lawyers in family mediation, see John 
Dewar, ‘Family Law and its Discontents’ (2000) 14 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 59; Becky Batagol, ‘Fomenters of Strife, Gladiatorial 
Champions or Something Else Entirely? Lawyers and Family Dispute Resolution’ 
(2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 24.
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Macmillan, 2nd ed, 1968).
10 We first suggested this way of thinking about family mediation in Field and 
Crowe, above n 3.
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mediation and the more formal principles and procedures of family law, 
noting that mediation tends to mirror to some extent the expectations of 
the formal legal framework. We conclude that parties who lack an under-
standing of these features of the family mediation environment may face 
significant difficulties in effectively advancing their interests. 
The article concludes by exploring the implications for mediator ethics 
of the problem outlined in the preceding sections. We look at the ethical 
role of the mediator in the family dispute resolution process, arguing that 
a rethinking of mediator ethics is required if mediators are to effectively 
support the parties to participate to their full potential. In our view, media-
tors must play an ethically active role in preparing and supporting the 
parties to operate effectively within the mediation language game. This 
requires a more sophisticated understanding of party self-determination 
that goes beyond simply letting the parties drive the process.
II  lanGuaGe GaMes and clashes oF Genres
It is useful to begin our analysis of family mediation by looking at the 
implicit expectations that lie behind different forms of social interaction. 
Diverse social environments reflect different expectations as to appropri-
ate or expected forms of speech and behaviour. The expectations governing 
behaviour in a courtroom, for example, are different from those operating 
at a party, in a lecture theatre or on a sporting field. This is not only 
because those forms of activity involve different objectives, but because 
different approaches are needed to communicate effectively in each differ-
ent environment. In other words, there are diverse conventions operating 
in each setting that are predictive of the potential of the success or failure 
of communicative aims.
In a courtroom, for example, arguments couched in terms of legal 
principles, rules of evidence and so forth will be effective, whereas state-
ments that fall outside those rules may fail to be heard. At a party, certain 
types of comments will contribute to smooth conversation, while other 
types (such as offensive jokes, inappropriate questions or sharing of 
overly personal information) may cause social discomfort and be ignored 
or shunned by other party-goers. In a university lecture theatre, some 
student contributions will be welcomed and recognised by the lecturer 
(such as constructive questions and comments), while others (such as 
unsolicited, disruptive interjections, personal conversation or irrelevant 
comments) are likely to be dismissed, ignored or challenged. Similar 
conventions of appropriate speech and behaviour apply in many other 
types of social contexts.
A   The Role of Language Games
A deeper understanding of the different forms of discourse that arise 
in social life can be achieved by drawing on Wittgenstein’s concept of a 
language game. Wittgenstein describes a language game as a set of rules 
for the use of language in social interaction, with ‘the speaking of language 
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[being] part of an activity, or of a form of life’.11 Wittgenstein notes that 
language fundamentally influences – and, indeed, constructs – the ways 
in which people interact. Language is linked to social behaviour and to 
the social dynamic.12 People associate certain words and phrases with 
particular forms of behaviour and vice versa.
The notion of a language game therefore refers to a holistic form of 
social behaviour, where language and behaviour intertwine to create a 
web of expectations that are specific to that context. Certain forms of 
language go together with certain types of actions. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, for an outsider to a specific context, someone who lacks pre-
existing knowledge of the linguistic and behavioural conventions of that 
context, to appreciate all the linkages that are taken for granted by those 
who are more familiar with this backdrop. Wittgenstein makes the point 
that people are often unable to participate seamlessly in a language game 
unless they already understand, to a certain extent, the rules that apply. 
Wittgenstein illustrates this point through the example of the name of 
a piece in chess.13 If you are shown a piece from a chess set and told, ‘this 
is the king’, it does not show you how to use the piece, unless you already 
understand the rules of the game. On the other hand, if you do know the 
rules of the game and you are told that a certain piece is the ‘king’, then 
you will know how to use it. The name ‘king’, when affixed to a specific 
piece, will tell a competent chess player to only move it one square in any 
direction, to protect it from threats by opposing pieces and so forth. This 
complex web of associations, however, will be inaccessible to the person 
who is unfamiliar with the background rules.
A person who lacks an understanding of the rules of chess will be 
unable to play the game, even if they are given fragments of relevant 
information, such as the names of the pieces. Similarly, in the courtroom, 
there are well-documented difficulties that arise when an unrepresented 
litigant attempts to engage in courtroom advocacy.14 The litigant may 
be told at the outset, ‘that is the judge’, ‘this is the rule against hearsay’ 
and so on. However, they still lack the complex web of knowledge and 
expertise that would enable them to successfully navigate the required 
11 Wittgenstein, above n 9, 11 [23].
12 Ibid 4 [6].
13 Ibid 15 [31].
14 For discussion of this issue in the Australian family law context, see Catherine 
Caruana, ‘Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants in Family Law 
Matters’ (2002) 62 Family Matters 38; Rosemary Hunter et al, The Changing 
Face of Litigation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Court of Australia 
(Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2002); John Dewar, Jeff 
Giddings and Stephen Parker, ‘The Impact of Legal Aid Changes on Family 
Law Practice’ (1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 33; Ian Coleman, 
‘Unrepresented Litigants and the Family Court’ (1998) 73 Reform 41; Rosemary 
Hunter, ‘Litigants in Person in Contested Cases in the Family Court’ (1998) 
12 Australian Journal of Family Law 171. See also generally Jess Smith and 
Victoria Worrell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Self-Represented Litigants’ (2015) 
37(9) Bulletin (Law Society of South Australia) 15; Boulle and Field, above n 2, 
Ch 6.
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speech and behaviour of the courtroom context. For that reason, it is 
generally unrealistic to expect unrepresented litigants without any form 
of legal training to engage in the process effectively without some form 
of assistance.15
Chess games and courtroom interactions are relatively formal modes 
of behaviour. However, part of Wittgenstein’s point is that even less formal 
types of social interaction are structured by underlying expectations. As 
we saw above, it is possible for inexperienced participants to unwittingly 
flout the applicable conventions at a party or in a lecture theatre, no less 
than in the courtroom. The consequences may be less serious, but in each 
case effective communication and behaviour depends on understanding 
and internalising the background norms that make up the language game 
applicable in that context.
In terms of formality, family mediation falls somewhere between the 
highly structured, formalised environment of the courtroom and the more 
informal context of a social conversation. However, the stakes are higher 
than in many other contexts, since the futures of families hang in the 
balance. As Jean-François Lyotard notes in reference to Wittgenstein’s 
theory, the term ‘language game’, with its frivolous connotations, can 
seem inapt when one considers what may be at stake. ‘You don’t play 
around with language. And in this sense, there are no language games. 
There are stakes tied to genres of discourse.’16
It is therefore important to take seriously the barriers that exist to 
effective participation in family mediation for parties who are unfamiliar 
with the process and lack pre-existing knowledge of its conventions. 
Parties in family mediation, particularly those who already experience a 
power differential, need to be able to engage with the language game of 
family mediation in order to articulate their interests and those of their 
children. However, this requires a level of background knowledge that 
it is easy to take for granted. Recognising the language game at work in 
family mediation therefore takes on political significance, with issues of 
fairness and justice potentially at stake.17
B   Recognising Clashes of Genres
Many of the problems people face in negotiating unfamiliar modes of social 
discourse arise from what we might term clashes of genres. A clash of 
genres occurs when a person accustomed to operating within one language 
game seeks to follow the same modes of communication and behaviour 
15 See, for example, William Fotherby, ‘Law that is Pro Se (Not Poetry): Towards 
a System of Civil Justice that Works for Litigants without Lawyers’ (2010) 
16 Auckland University Law Review 54; Margaret Castles, ‘Self-Represented 
Litigants: A Major 21st Century Challenge’ (2015) 37(9) Bulletin (Law Society of 
South Australia) 14.
16 Jean-François Lyotard, The Différend: Phrases in Dispute (Georges Van Den 
Abbeele trans, University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 137 [188]. 
17 Ibid 139 [192]. 
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within a context governed by a different language game.18 For example, 
a person accustomed to swearing when among friends may use the same 
language at a social gathering where it offends or alienates the listeners. 
Similarly, a person accustomed to using highly emotive language when 
engaged in personal negotiations may take the same approach when argu-
ing in a courtroom, where it is likely to prove counterproductive.
The highly structured environment of the courtroom means that even 
a person unfamiliar with it is likely to be aware that it calls for different 
behaviour than in other types of social contexts. Mediation, as we have 
seen, is less formal than the courtroom; however, this relative informality 
is a double-edged sword for the inexperienced player. On the one hand, 
formal rules and procedures do not need to be followed in order to be 
heard. On the other hand, the sense of informality may give parties the 
misleading impression that mediation lacks its own conventions of effec-
tive speech and behaviour.
For example, a clash of genres may arise in family mediation if a party 
communicates using the framework of adversarial negotiation, employing 
aggressive and positional language, rather than recognising and respond-
ing to the expected focus on collaborative, cooperative and interest-based 
communication. This kind of behaviour is by no means uncommon in 
mediation, but the party employing it may not understand why it is out of 
place and, therefore, the risks involved in employing it. An inexperienced 
participant in mediation might also rely on other inappropriate genres of 
discourse, such as the genres governing personal conversation or negotia-
tion within the privacy of a relationship. 
The role of the mediator, of course, is to ensure that both parties are 
heard and their emotions are heard but managed. Family mediators may 
attempt to discourage aggressive positioning, in order to facilitate positive 
option generation and collaborative bargaining. Our point, though, is that 
this is a more complex exercise than it might at first appear. The expecta-
tions of the family mediation process will not be met by overly legalistic 
argument, but nor will they be satisfied by overly emotive contributions. It 
may seem obvious to the mediator what forms of behaviour and speech are 
appropriate, but this may be far from evident to the parties. Furthermore, 
the parties may have different levels of understanding that prevent them 
from engaging equally in the process. 
We do not mean to suggest that emotive approaches can never succeed 
in family mediation. An emotional or undiplomatic participant may some-
times gain an advantage in negotiations by setting the agenda or wearing 
down the other party. They may cry or disengage from the process and 
leave the other party in a difficult position. However, the approach is 
18 The notion of a clash of genres, as we use it here, draws significantly on Lyotard’s 
notion of the differend. See Lyotard, above n 16. For further discussion, see Field 
and Crowe, above n 3; Jonathan Crowe, ‘Reinterpreting Government Neutrality’ 
(2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 118; Constance Youngwon 
Lee and Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Deafening Silence of the “Comfort Women”: A 
Response Based on Lyotard and Irigaray’ (2015) 2 Asian Journal of Law and 
Society 339.
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risky. The other party may exploit it by sticking more closely to expected 
modes of conduct and depicting the first party as unbalanced, irrational 
or unconcerned about the children’s best interests. It is also possible that 
an emotive approach could lead to the mediation being abandoned, leav-
ing the parties exposed to the risks of litigation. An overly emotive or 
disengaged approach could also lead the mediator to conclude that the 
party did not make a genuine effort, which in theory creates the potential 
for an adverse costs order.19
The implicit and unarticulated nature of language games means that 
clashes of genres are insidious and prone to go unnoticed. This is prob-
lematic given the political significance of family mediation. In the case of 
a clash of genres in family mediation, the fairness of negotiations may be 
compromised, without this being obvious or straightforwardly discernible 
in the outcome. The parties will typically be unable to explicitly identify 
or articulate the nature or existence of the clash of genres. By comparison, 
an injustice that occurs in a more formalised setting such as a courtroom 
may be more easily noticed and remedied, particularly when all parties 
are aware of the applicable norms of discourse.20 
The fact that courtroom litigation is dominated by legal professionals 
means that the applicable genre can become highly specialised, without 
compromising effective communication.21 Indeed, context-appropriate 
specific communication can be achieved through a common language 
used by all the parties. It is for this reason, however, that unrepresented 
litigants face such significant challenges. They are required to negoti-
ate a highly complex language game, premised on a background store 
of knowledge that they simply do not possess. As we saw previously, the 
unrepresented litigant is like the person in Wittgenstein’s story, who is 
told that a chess piece represents the ‘king’, without knowing the rules of 
the game. Experienced advocates, by contrast, are the grandmasters of 
the language game of law. Their background knowledge enables them to 
operate successfully and with confidence within the courtroom. 
The average participant in family mediation comes to the process as a 
novice, not a grandmaster. There is no guarantee that a particular party 
will have any prior familiarity with the speech and behaviour norms of 
family mediation; they will not know the rules of the family mediation 
language game. It follows that family mediation is not an environment 
where it can be assumed that everyone is following the same conventions, 
or that the process evens or levels the negotiation field. The potential for a 
clash of genres in family mediation is therefore high. Consequently, parties 
who can express their interests while complying with the genre are likely 
to gain an advantage over those who lack the same level of knowledge. This 
creates the potential for inequities to arise within the process.
19 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60I(8). 
20 Compare Lyotard, above n 16, 196-197.
21 For further discussion of the legal genre of discourse, see Jonathan Crowe, 
‘Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics’ (2007) 27(4) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 775, 785-786; Crowe, ‘Reinterpreting Government Neutrality’, above n 18.
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III  the MedIatIon lanGuaGe GaMe
We suggested in the previous section that participants in family media-
tion may be disadvantaged if they fail to grasp the conventions of the 
mediation language game. These conventions are complex, but are rarely 
fully articulated and may be taken for granted. The converse is also true; 
parties who understand the rules of the game will be able to make the 
most of the negotiation opportunities offered. In this section, we look in 
more detail at two particular features of the family mediation process 
that shape the applicable genre of discourse. These are, first, the notion 
of party self-determination; and, second, the fact that the process may be 
implicitly guided by formal legal rules and principles.
A  The Porosity of Mediation
One generally positive feature of family mediation is its emphasis on party 
self-determination.22 Party self-determination is a process goal of media-
tion driven by the value of party autonomy.23 The notion encompasses a 
number of related ideas, including direct participation, control over the 
content of a dispute, and party dignity, self-agency and empowerment.24 
As Nancy Welsh notes, party self-determination is widely described as 
‘the fundamental principle of mediation’.25 Welsh usefully summarises 
party self-determination in terms of four core characteristics: active and 
direct participation by the parties in communicating and negotiating; 
party choice and control over the substantive norms that guide their 
decision-making; party involvement in the creation of settlement options; 
and party control over the terms and adoption of any agreement.26 
A central aspect of the mediator’s ethical role is to support party self-
determination.27 This feature of mediator ethics emphasises ‘the ability 
22 The National Mediator Accreditation System (NMAS) now defines ‘mediation’ as 
‘a process that promotes the self-determination of participants’. See Mediation 
Standards Board, National Mediator Accreditation System: Practice Standards 
(2015) ss 2, 9.
23 For further discussion of the values and goals of dispute resolution processes 
see Boulle and Field, above n 2, Ch 4. See also Gerald Dworkin, The Theory 
and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 122; Robert A 
Baruch Bush and Joseph P Folger, The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative 
Approach to Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 2005).
24 Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Self-Determination in International Mediation: 
Some Preliminary Reflections’ (2005) 7 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 
277.
25 Nancy A Welsh, ‘The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-connected 
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?’ (2001) 6 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 1, 3. 
26 Ibid 4.
27 See, for example, Rachael Field, ‘Mediation Ethics in Australia – A Case for 
Rethinking the Foundational Paradigm’ (2012) 19 James Cook University Law 
Review 41; Rachael Field, ‘Rethinking Mediation Ethics: A Contextual Method to 
Support Party Self-Determination’ (2011) 22(1) Australasian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 8; Rachael Field, ‘Exploring the Potential of Contextual Ethics in 
92
ETHICS IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of individuals to speak for themselves’ and an ‘individual’s competency 
and right to make their own decisions’.28 Mediators do not impose an 
outcome on the parties;29 rather, they reinforce the relational orientation 
of the process, ensuring that it creates the potential for outcomes that 
are ‘just to all parties concerned’.30 In this way, parties are situated as 
having the standing to seek a resolution of the dispute that recognises 
their individual needs and interests. The mediation process achieves this 
by remaining relatively informal and unstructured. However, the lack of 
formal structure renders mediation porous; it is prone to be infiltrated and 
shaped by the unstated expectations of both the mediator and the parties. 
Family mediation commonly commences with the mediator setting out 
ground rules, such as that the parties will ‘respect the process’.31 However, 
the exact content of such a ground rule is, of course, intrinsically vague. It 
is at this level that the porosity of mediation begins to become apparent. 
Inherent in the establishment of ground rules are a number of expecta-
tions, hopes or aspirations for how the process will work. The mediator 
generally expects – or at least aspires – that the parties will respect the 
process by listening actively and responsively to each other and engaging 
in cooperative and collaborative communication. Mediators generally 
also expect or hope that the parties will attempt to engage in consensus 
bargaining and positive option generation.32 This normative context is 
well known to the mediator, but may be somewhat opaque for the parties. 
Mediators will, of course, often attempt to make these expectations 
and aspirations clear during party preparation or the mediator’s opening 
statement. However, it is difficult – if not impossible – to convey the full 
extent of the expectations and hopes for the process in such a format. The 
informal and party-directed nature of mediation, on the other hand, risks 
giving the impression that there are few or no rules or conventions that 
the parties need to know to succeed in the process. In other words, media-
tion’s emphasis on self-determination may give parties the misleading 
idea that there is no applicable language game to be learnt. The parties 
are likely to be at an informational deficit in relation to the mediator’s 
knowledge and objectives, lacking a real grasp of the expectations at play. 
Mediation’ in Francesca Bartlett, Reid Mortensen and Kieran Tranter (eds), 
Alternative Perspectives on Legal Ethics (Routledge, 2010).
28 Marsha Lichtenstein, ‘Mediation and Feminism: Common Values and Challenges’ 
(2000) 18 Mediation Quarterly 19, 21.
29 Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle 
for Truly Educated Decision-Making’ (1999) 74(3) Notre Dame Law Review 775, 
790.
30 Marian Roberts, ‘Systems or Selves? Some Ethical Issues in Family Mediation’ 
(1992) 10 Mediation Quarterly 3, 11.
31 Ruth Charlton and Micheline Dewdney, The Mediator’s Handbook: Skills and 
Strategies for Practitioners (Lawbook Co, 2nd ed, 2004) 12-14, 18; Laurence 
Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2005) 184.
32 Compare Hilary Astor, ‘Making a Genuine Effort in Family Dispute Resolution: 
What Does It Mean?’ (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 102, 113.
93
PLAYING THE LANGUAGE GAME OF FAMILY MEDIATION
For this reason, somewhat paradoxically, the mediator’s commitment 
to party self-determination may make it more difficult in practice for 
participants to effectively learn and internalise the rules of the applicable 
language game. The more parties are left to speak for themselves and 
make their own decisions, the less they can draw on the expertise and 
guidance of others to negotiate the conventions of the mediation process. 
The mediator’s commitment to self-determination may therefore make it 
difficult for the parties to learn the language game of mediation, which in 
turn may make it difficult for them to achieve self-determination in any 
true sense of the term. The answer, as we suggest below, is not to abandon 
self-determination as a guiding principle of mediator ethics, but rather 
to reconceptualise the notion to take account of the dynamics described 
above. 
B  Mediation and the Legal Paradigm
Another distinctive feature of family mediation is that it operates within 
the context of the formal principles and procedures of family law, without 
being strictly constrained by them. Family mediation occurs within the 
framework of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and for this reason it can 
tend to mirror, at least to some extent, the expectations of the formal legal 
environment, both in terms of content and process. There are, of course, 
important differences between the mediation and courtroom environ-
ments. The courtroom genre of discourse, as we noted above, is focused 
on positional argumentation where there is a third party arbiter – namely, 
the judge – to make a binding decision. Mediation, on the other hand, is 
a collaborative bargaining process focused on providing the parties with 
an opportunity to exercise self-determination in presenting and resolving 
their dispute.33 
The interests-based focus of mediation (as opposed to the rights-based 
focus of the courtroom) may give parties the impression that the process 
and its outcomes are not influenced by formal legal rules.34 This impression 
may be bolstered by the relatively informal and party-driven nature of the 
process. The reality, however, is that family mediation – like mediation 
generally – inevitably takes place ‘in the shadow of the law’.35 Despite 
mediation’s relatively unstructured nature, the law still provides the 
general principles and concepts that serve as the implicit backdrop and 
33 See Baruch Bush and Folger, above n 23.
34 Compare Boulle, above n 31, 28-29; Welsh, above n 25, 3-4.
35 Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. We acknowledge, however, 
the work of Becky Batagol and Thea Brown, which cautions that this effect should 
not be overstated. See Becky Batagol and Thea Brown, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of Family Mediation (Federation Press, 2011). For further 
discussion, see Boulle and Field, above n 2, Ch 11; Field and Crowe, above n 3, 
104-107.
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framework for negotiations.36 This legal framework is further expressly 
enshrined in the relevant parts of the Family Law Rules.37 
At a broader level, there is a sense in which all forms of social 
discourse take place in the shadow of law. Norms and concepts that enjoy 
legal force tend to be mirrored or adopted in other social contexts. This 
is because legal norms enjoy a privileged normative status in the social 
environment. As Joseph Raz notes, legal systems are distinguished in part 
by their comprehensiveness – ‘they claim authority to regulate any type 
of behaviour’ – and they claim supremacy over other normative systems 
operating within the community.38 A normative system that makes these 
types of overarching claims to authority will naturally find its content 
mirrored to some degree in other types of social institutions.
It follows that the normative claims of family law will tend to influence 
the norms of family mediation practice. The existence of legal rules about 
family matters implies that family disputes ought to be resolved along 
those lines, thereby imposing a set of social expectations and aspirations 
that cannot help but play some role in the mediation process. The Family 
Law Act, for example, imposes a strong expectation that parents will be 
child-focused in negotiating parenting arrangements; specifically, there is 
an expectation that negotiations will keep the child’s best interests clearly 
and consistently in mind.39 It follows that parties who possess a general 
understanding of the law relating to parental responsibility and the best 
interests of the child may be better equipped to engage effectively in the 
mediation negotiation environment than those who lack such knowledge.
Family mediators operating within the Family Law Act are further 
obliged to direct the parties’ attention to a range of other factors when 
negotiating parenting arrangements, including the desirability of the 
child spending ‘substantial and significant time’ with each parent and 
issues about the ‘reasonable practicability’ of proposed outcomes.40 The 
mediator is likely to enter the process with some understanding, guided 
by the law, of what these concepts mean. This, in turn, will play a role in 
determining the mediator’s expectations and aspirations for the process. A 
party who has some grasp of this framework will be well placed to interact 
36 Olivia Rundle, ‘Barking Dogs: Lawyer Attitudes Towards Direct Disputant 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation of General Civil Cases’ (2008) 8 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77, 87.
37 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) Sch 1, Pt 2, s 1(6)(a).
38 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford University Press, 1999) 150-152. 
For further discussion, see Crowe, ‘Reinterpreting Government Neutrality’, above 
n 18.
39 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 63DA(2)(a)(ii). See also Jennifer McIntosh, Yvonne 
Wells and Caroline Long, ‘Child-Focused and Child-Inclusive Family Dispute 
Resolution: One Year Findings from a Prospective Study of Outcomes’ (2007) 
13 Journal of Family Studies 8. For a discussion and critique of the best inter-
ests of the child principle in Australian family law, see Jonathan Crowe and 
Lisa Toohey, ‘From Good Intentions to Ethical Outcomes: The Paramountcy of 
Children’s Interests in the Family Law Act’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 391.
40 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 63DA(2)(a), (b). See also ss 63DA(3), 65DAA(5).
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seamlessly with the mediator’s expectations and effectively articulate 
their interests – in effect they will be able to play the family mediation 
language game. A party who lacks this knowledge, by contrast, may be 
placed at a disadvantage in playing the relevant language game. 
IV  rethInkInG MedIator ethIcs
We argued in the previous sections that the family mediation process 
incorporates implicit conventions of appropriate speech and conduct that 
may be opaque to inexperienced participants. Parties who fail to appreci-
ate and internalise these conventions may not be able to make the most 
of the negotiation opportunities offered by the mediation process. This 
signals an issue of fairness that warrants further attention. The ques-
tion therefore arises as to what can be done to assist parties to engage 
effectively with the mediation environment. The current section considers 
the implications of this challenge for mediator ethics. We consider how 
mediators can help parties play the language game of mediation and what 
this means for mediator impartiality and party self-determination. 
A  Recognising Mediation Practice
We argued in the previous section that family dispute resolution prac-
titioners bring pre-existing expectations to the mediation process that 
play an important role in structuring the negotiations. These expectations 
may involve the nature of the mediation process itself or the normative 
framework provided by the rules and principles of family law. We also 
suggested that parties are, to a large extent, on their own in dealing with 
the requirements of family mediation, especially if lawyers are excluded 
from the process. However, it might be thought that this view of the 
mediation environment understates the constructive role mediators can 
and do play in preparing and informing the parties. 
Many family mediation practitioners are highly reflective about their 
role and the dynamics of the mediation context. Mediators may well be 
aware of the expectations they bring to the process and strive through self-
reflection to avoid imposing these inappropriately on the parties. There is 
also undoubtedly an important role for the mediator in assisting parties 
to cope with the demands and expectations of the process. Mediators often 
spend significant time and effort explaining to the parties what mediation 
involves.41 This occurs in intake processes, at the start of the mediation 
and during negotiations. 
Family mediators have the capacity to respond actively and construc-
tively to the dynamics of unfolding negotiations, including providing 
information, guidance and encouragement to parties who struggle to make 
their voices heard. They can reflect upon and respond to their own biases 
regarding language proficient and highly educated parties or parties who 
seem under-equipped, emotional or overwhelmed. They can also be alert 
41 Compare Boulle, above n 31, 182-184.
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to power imbalances arising from both relational factors and an imbalance 
in levels of preparation and knowledge, seeking to address these while 
remaining within the confines of their role.
Mediators routinely provide legal information to the parties in family 
mediation. That is, they explain the legal context within which the process 
occurs and the need to focus on the best interests of children.42 They cannot 
ensure that parties internalise these principles or use them effectively and 
consistently to frame their contributions, but they can at least take steps 
to reduce informational deficits. Mediators also frequently help the parties 
to learn and apply the basic skills of negotiation, both in plenary sessions 
and in private caucus; indeed, supporting the parties in the practice of 
basic negotiation skills is a recognised part of the mediator’s role.43 Finally, 
mediators will often be aware that many parties lack any experience with 
the mediation process at all and will modify their approaches accordingly. 
Mediators therefore certainly have something to offer in terms of the 
issues outlined in this article. Indeed, one of our chief aims in exploring 
this area is to provide a focal point for reflective approaches to media-
tion practice and recognition of the complex and nuanced nature of the 
mediator’s role. It is also necessary, however, to be aware of the limits on 
how far mediators can effectively address the problem we have outlined, 
particularly within the current ethical paradigm for mediation. This is 
because the prevailing ethical paradigm imposes its own expectations on 
mediators concerning the nature and aims of the process which constrain 
their ability to address power imbalances and help inform the parties.
B  Impartiality and Self-Determination
One of the chief expectations placed on mediators in the mediation process 
is that of mediator impartiality.44 Mediator neutrality and impartiality 
have long been at the heart of mediation theory and practice; for many, 
these notions are the ‘hallmark of mediation and one of the primary reasons 
for its success as an alternative dispute resolution method’.45 The precise 
meaning of these terms has been the subject of long-running discussion 
and debate. They have become, in many ways, elusive and idealised 
42 Family dispute resolution practitioners are, indeed, required to provide this kind 
of general advice under the Family Law Act (Cth) s 63DA.
43 Boulle, above n 31, 219.
44 See, for example, Hilary Astor, ‘Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory 
and Practice’ (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 221; Hilary Astor, ‘Rethinking 
Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice – Part I’ (2000) 11 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 73; Hilary Astor, ‘Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform 
Practice – Part II’ (2000) 11 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 145; Field 
and Crowe, above n 3, 110-114.
45 William A Donohue, ‘Communicative Competence in Mediators’ in Kenneth 
Kressel and Dean C Pruitt (eds), Mediation Research: The Process and 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention (Jossey-Bass, 1989) 322-343. See also 
Hilary Astor, ‘Mediator Neutrality’, above n 43; Folberg and Taylor, above n 4, 
7-8; Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving 
Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 1996) 14. Compare Boulle, above n 31, 31.
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concepts;46 leading commentators have described neutrality in particular 
as ‘folklore’ and a ‘myth’.47 It is nonetheless possible to pick out some key 
components of mediator impartiality as conventionally understood. At 
its core is the principle that the mediator is to be even-handed between 
the parties and uninvolved in the content of the dispute. An impartial 
mediator is expected to lack bias, have no interest in the outcome and 
make no judgement about the parties and their respective claims. The 
picture that emerges is that the impartial mediator is detached and 
uninvolved, whereas an involved and interventionist mediator oversteps 
the boundaries of their ethical role. 
There is a clear connection here between mediator impartiality and the 
notion of party self-determination, as discussed previously in this article. 
Party self-determination, as generally understood, requires the parties 
and not the mediator to determine the course of the content of negotiations. 
It emphasises the ability of the parties to speak for themselves and make 
their own decisions. In this respect, both mediator impartiality and party 
self-determination are in direct tension with the capacity of practitioners 
to assist parties to overcome informational deficits and engage effectively 
with the mediation language game. This is particularly the case where 
one party is better equipped than the other to engage with the process. In 
such a case, a mediator who assists and advises the affected party not only 
risks seeming interventionist, but may also appear biased by providing 
aid to one party over another. 
A related problem concerns the tension between the ideal of a detached, 
impartial mediator and the reality, considered in the previous section of 
this article, that mediators bring their own expectations to the family 
mediation environment. Mediators may attempt to be impartial, but they 
inevitably have some expectations or aspirations – however general and 
modest – for how the process will unfold. At the least, they will hope to 
help the parties express their interests and reach a mutual outcome – 
an expectation that brings with it an implicit understanding of how the 
parties might contribute to or hinder that end. Family mediators will often 
have additional expectations or hopes of creating a child-centred focus for 
negotiations. These expectations play a role in constructing the language 
game of family mediation. The parties, however, may not be fully aware 
of this framework. Furthermore, mediators may be reluctant to speak 
openly to the parties about their own views and preferences, for fear of 
being seen as overly prescriptive, biased or interventionist in what is said 
to be a party-driven process.
Mediators are also constrained in their ability to respond where 
uncertainty about the applicable legal framework becomes apparent 
during the course of negotiations. This is partly due to the demands of 
46 Howard Gadlin and Elizabeth W Pino, ‘Neutrality: A Guide for the Organisation 
Ombudsperson’ (1997) 13 Negotiation Journal 17, 17.
47 Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen and Sara Cobb, ‘Toward a New Discourse for 
Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality’ (1991) 9(2) Mediation Quarterly 151, 152; 
Boulle, above n 31, 31.
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impartiality and self-determination, as discussed above. However, it may 
also be because providing expert legal advice is seen as clearly outside 
the mediator’s role. If a significant uncertainty manifests itself about the 
interpretation or relevance of a specific legal principle, a mediator may 
feel the best they can do is urge the parties to seek independent advice.48 
This, of course, will not necessarily mean the mediator lacks their own 
view on the issue; to this extent, the mediator’s implicit or subconscious 
expectations may not be fully mirrored or revealed in their formal advice 
to the participants.
The ethical obligation of family mediators to help parties play the 
applicable language game is therefore in tension with traditional concep-
tions of mediator impartiality and party self-determination. The answer to 
this dilemma, in our view, is to shift the focus of mediator ethics away from 
impartiality and towards a revised understanding of self-determination 
that is more responsive to the dynamics of the mediation process.49 Self-
determination is not just a matter of letting the parties speak and decide 
their own outcomes. Rather, genuine self-determination depends on the 
ability of both parties to engage effectively in the mediation language 
game. This will require the mediator to play an active role in preparing, 
guiding and informing the parties, both at the start of the process and 
during negotiations. In some cases, the mediator may need to assist one 
party in particular where there is a clear imbalance in knowledge and 
understanding. 
V  conclusIon
We noted at the start of this article that family mediation offers a range of 
potential benefits to parties in post-separation disputes. These benefits are 
only fully realised, however, when all parties have the capacity to engage 
effectively in the mediation language game. The increasing prominence of 
mediation as a mode of family dispute resolution means it is crucial that 
barriers to effective participation are recognised and addressed. A wide 
range of disputes in family law and other areas are now resolved through 
mediation, but the legitimacy of those outcomes is often simply taken for 
granted.50 We would suggest that the outcomes of family mediation cannot 
truly be regarded as legitimate unless the process itself is fair and acces-
sible to all parties. This requires scrutiny of not merely the aspirations of 
mediation, but also the underlying conventions that structure the process.
Parties who know how to play the mediation language game will have 
a clear advantage over those who do not, potentially exacerbating the 
dangers of mediation for vulnerable participants.51 Mediators therefore 
have an ethical duty to ensure that all parties are prepared to engage 
effectively in the process by understanding the relevant genre of discourse. 
48 See Batagol, above n 8, 39. 
49 Compare Field and Crowe, above n 3.
50 See Field and Crowe, above n 3.
51 See Field and Crowe, above n 3.
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This role may seem at odds with traditional views of impartiality and 
self-determination; in reality, though, such a role can be argued to be 
necessary to ensure that genuine self-determination is a real possibility. 
We have therefore contended that party self-determination should be 
reconceptualised to acknowledge the need for the mediator to help parties 
avoid clashes of genres. This will sometimes require them to play an active 
role in the process.
We noted above that family mediators already often spend significant 
time and effort informing and equipping the parties. These existing prac-
tices are, in some ways, at odds with traditional views of impartiality and 
self-determination. The point of our argument is therefore not to critique 
the practices of family mediators, so much as to bring mediator ethics 
in line with what mediators are already doing.52 Sometimes, it may be 
necessary to change the practice of mediation to bring it into line with 
ethical principles; at other times, however, ethical principles need to adapt 
to the realities of mediation practice. We have suggested that mediator 
ethics needs to recognise the challenge of preparing parties to play the 
mediation language game. This will help resolve some of the tensions that 
exist between traditional theories of mediator ethics and the realities of 
family mediation. 
52 This is consistent with the view of mediator ethics advanced in Jonathan Crowe, 
‘Ethics and the Mediation Community’ (2015) 26 Australasian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 20.
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